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  INDIGENOUS RIGHTS BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A CALL FOR A PRO INDIVIDUAL INTERPRETATION 
 
VALERIO DE OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI 
DILTON RIBEIRO 
 
In its traditional conception, international law regulates relations between sovereign states. This 
definition is challenged by current developments of international law, especially in the area of 
human rights. The human person is arguably a bearer of rights and duties under international 
law. However, recognizing this individual legal personality is not enough. International bodies 
and treaties need to acknowledge that individuals are subjects of international law within a 
pluralistic world. In other words, the law of nations must crystalize the idea that individuals 
are, with all their cultural differences, subjects of international law. The Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights recognizes this view through its pro homine principle, which informs that 
human rights instruments must seek the best possible protection for the human person. In this 
interpretative framework, the Inter-American Court crystalized a body of norms protecting 
indigenous rights and their cultural and historical backgrounds within the general protection 
system of the American Convention. The extensive interpretation of rights articulates a new 
view on the individual legal personality. Accordingly, this article seeks to understand this 
approach based on key decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on indigenous 
cases.  
 
I.THE RECOGNITION OF MULTICULTURALISM is unquestionably one of the most 
significant post-Second World War movements stemmed from the notion of individual 
personality and human centrality. It is intrinsically linked to the conception of the human 
person as a bearer of cultural characteristics that are indispensable to a full and useful existence 
and that, consequently, must always be observed and respected. Political philosophy, especially 
after the 1980s, made room for debate and the development of multiple conceptions of 
multiculturalism. This debate, which soon later became a concern of law and for lawyers, was 
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strongly rooted in a divergence between communitarians and liberals, and many questions and 
different philosophical theories and perspectives still surround this discussion.1 
In the area of public policy, this topic bears considerable importance. States and the 
international community as a whole look to better accommodate national minorities and foreign 
individuals. Yet, they face a modern world where technology facilitates immigration and with 
territories that are occupied, peacefully or not, by peoples with diverse cultural characteristics. 
These characteristics go beyond the territorial boundaries where these individuals reside and 
include a mosaic of features, such as language, religion, philosophical views, and social 
conditions that constitute an intrinsic part of these individuals. Accordingly, this reality 
generates heated public debates that are part of states’ political agenda, especially after the 
Second World War.2 
                                                 
1. In political philosophy, the debate on multiculturalism, which relates to a body of ideas concerning legal 
accommodation and policies of ethnic diversity, is strongly divided between the liberal and communitarian 
approaches. Liberals essentially argue that individuals must be free to decide their own concept of good life and 
not be constrained by any enforced or inherited condition. Conversely, communitarians affirm that every human 
being is connected through roles in social relations. Kymlicka argues differently by asserting that debates 
concerning individuals and groups reach a consensus on liberalism and democracy, but disagree on the 
interpretation of these principles in multiethnic and multinational societies. For a general view on the concept of 
multiculturalism, on the liberal and communitarian dichotomy, and on the characteristics or argument of 
multiculturalism, see , Charles Taylor, “Interculturalism or Multiculturalism?”, (2012) 38 Philosophy & Social 
Criticism 413; John Arthur, “Multi-culturalism” in Hugh Lafollette, ed, The Oxford Handbook Of Practical Ethics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); Michael Murphy, Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction (Abingdon/ US/Canada : 
Routledge, 2012); Interview by Verena Risse and Martin Vezér with Will Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism in Theory 
and Practice”, (2008)1 Rerum Causae 3 at 62; Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, And The Future 
(Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012); Duncan Ivinson, ed, The Ashgate Research Companion To 
Multiculturalism (England/USA : Ashgate Publishing Limited/ Company , 2010); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory Of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jeremy Waldron, 
“Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, (1992) 25 U MICH J L Reform 751; Michael McDonald, 
“Liberalism, Community, and Culture”, (1992) 42 U TORONTO  L J 113; Will Kymlicka, “The Rights of Minority 
Cultures: Reply to Kukathas”, (1992) 20 Political Theory 140; Chandran Kukathas, “Cultural Rights Again: A 
Rejoinder to Kymlicka”, (1992) 20 Political Theory 674; and Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the 
Politics of Recognition (1994).  
2. Ideas about the accommodation of minorities in multiethnic, multinational states have been part of policies for 
more than forty years. For a general view on the debate on multiculturalism and human rights or public policy, 
see Michael Kenny, The Politics of Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the Dilemmas of Difference (United 
States: Polity Press, 2004); Sarah Song, Justice, Gender And The Politics Of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Will Kymlicka, La Política Vernácula: Nacionalismo, Multiculturalimo Y 
Cidadania [Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship] (Barcelona: Paidos Iberica 
Ediciones S a, 2003) 30 [Kymlicka, La Política]; Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity 
in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) 59-67 [Benhabib, The Claims of Culture]; 
Courtney Jung, “Democratic Engagement with Ethnic Minority Claims: A Methodological Intervention into a 
Normative Debate” in Omid Payrow Shabani ed, Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate (University of 
Wales Press, 2007) 263-79; Melissa Williams, “Justice Towards Groups: Political not Juridical”, (1995) 23 
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Due to its practical, political, legal and philosophical relevance, multiculturalism is in 
a central stage in many different areas of study, such as education, philosophy and political 
science. Furthermore, it is a key aspect in debates concerning minorities, foreign population, 
immigration and diversity in general.3 But paradoxically, multiculturalism is not a central 
aspect of the literature of public international law, especially in the area of international human 
rights. This does not mean that international courts do not seriously discuss the accommodation 
of foreign population and the respect of minority rights, such as indigenous rights. This also 
does not mean that human rights scholars have not written on the importance to legally uphold 
cultural diversity and the recognition of the human person as a central aspect of international 
human rights law.4 
There is, however, a lack of writing on how international human rights courts 
accommodate minorities. More specifically, there is no or limited literature on how the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the principal judicial human rights body of the Organization 
of American States, accommodates minorities within the scope of the American Convention, 
the Court’s main treaty that almost exclusively establishes civil and political rights.5 This lack 
of existing literature weakens the legal debate and impedes an effective argument in favor of 
                                                 
Political Theory 75 and Michael Murphy, “The Limits of Culture in the Politics of Self-Determination”, (2001)1 
Ethnicities 367. 
3. See supra note 2. See also Jeff Spinner-Halev,  Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship (USA: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2000); Anne Philips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995);  Kwame A. Appiah & Amy Gutmann eds, Color Conscious: the Political Morality of Race (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998); Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, After Multiculturalism (United Kingdom: Foreign 
Policy Centre, 2000); Vernon Van Dyke, “The Individual, the State, and the Ethnic Communities in Political 
Theory”, (1977) 29 World Politics 343; and Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,1989) [Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community]. 
4. See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway “Reflections on Multiculturalism and International Law” in Sienho Yee & Jacques-
Yvan Morin eds, Multiculturalism and International Law Essays in Honor of Edward McWhinney 
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 2009) 166. As Mariko pointed out, international courts such as the 
International Court of Justice currently face a wide range of disputes reflecting different cultural backgrounds, 
which require solid and well-founded court decisions addressing such multicultural diversities. See Mariko 
Kawano, “The Administration of Justice by the International court of Justice and the Parties” in  Sienho Yee & 
Jacques-Yvan Morin eds, Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in Honor of Edward McWhinney  
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 2009) 300. 
5. The American Convention on Human Rights has one general provision on economic, social and cultural rights. 
See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 26, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 
Nº 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
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recognizing minority and vulnerable groups’ rights, which could ground future decisions of 
domestic and international courts. Consequently, academic writings could work as subsidiary 
references that help judges accommodate individuals’ rights within the international legal 
system.6 
This article thus seeks to understand the approach of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and how judges, by applying an extensive interpretation of its treaty, further 
recognized the individual legal personality under international law. The article also seeks to 
review how judges crystalized the view that individuals not only are bearers of rights and 
duties, but can also have different cultural and historical backgrounds from one another, which 
requires international courts to acknowledge this idea when interpreting and applying treaties. 
This reasoning, the pro homine principle, is the key pillar in truly recognizing the human person 
as a subject of international law. 
 
II. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
MULTICULTURAL WORLD 
International law traditionally refers to a group of norms and principles created by states in 
order to regulate their relations with one another.7 However, this traditional approach has met 
some practical and theoretical problems, especially in international human rights law. This 
article argues that human rights, as a particular system that is part of the broader realm of 
international law, differs from the latter in one central aspect: it recognizes the human person 
as a central element and acknowledges its international personality. This particularity forces 
judges and the international community as a whole to consider the interests and rights of 
individuals when interpreting and applying human rights norms. In accepting individuals as 
                                                 
6. United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, annex to the Charter of United Nations, art. 38, 
Jun. 26, 1945, Can. T.S. Nº 7. 
7. See J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1963) 1. See also L. Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise (Peace) (London/New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1912) 3. 
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bearers of rights and duties distinct from those of states, the international sphere not only 
recognizes the individual’s legal personality at the international level, but also acknowledges 
more extensively that all the particularities of the “human family”8 need to be important 
elements in the evolution and application of international law of human rights. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights9 seeks to recognize this multiculturalist and pluralist 
approach through the pro homine or pro individual interpretation. Accordingly, there is an 
intrinsic connection between the individual legal personality and an interpretation of human 
rights treaties that takes into consideration the wide variety of cultures of its individual subjects. 
States, as the traditional subjects of the law of nations, occupy a dominant position 
among the actors on the international level. Notwithstanding states’ dominant position, human 
rights instruments arguably confer rights and interests to individuals and change the 
hermeneutics of international law in order to accommodate the human person and acknowledge 
her status as the weak link in a state/individual dichotomy.10 
International human rights law instruments arguably seek to reconcile natural law 
concepts with legal positivism: they attempt to acknowledge in treaties and declarations the 
centrality of the individual in human rights. The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of 
Man, following the precepts of legal positivism, acknowledges in its preamble the importance 
of domestic legislation and the necessity for more cooperation between the American states to 
protect human rights.11 At the same time, this regional declaration takes a natural law 
                                                 
8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), 
preamble (Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
9. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, Chapter VIII. 
10. Valerio Mazzuoli, Curso de Direito Internacional Público (Textbook on Public International Law) (2013), 433-
34, 451-53. 
11. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, preamble, O.A.S. 
Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 
(1992) ( American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man) (stating that the “affirmation of essential human 
rights by the American States together with the guarantees given by the internal regimes of the states establish the 
initial system of protection considered by the American States as being suited to the present social and juridical 
conditions, not without a recognition on their part that they should increasingly strengthen that system in the 
international field as conditions become more favorable ….”). 
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perspective by acknowledging that states recognize that “the essential rights of man are not 
derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of his 
human personality.”12 This is a shift from the predominant positivist view that rights only stem 
from state agreements. Accordingly, members of the Organization of American States codify 
through the Declaration that states do not simply grant, but rather recognize, international 
human rights. This acknowledgement is based on the idea that human rights stem from the 
individual legal personality.13  
As a human rights declaration, the American Declaration was not initially envisaged to 
be a legally binding instrument. However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights faced 
the question of whether this declaration had normative force when Colombia requested an 
advisory opinion on this issue.14 The Court found that to determine the legal status of the 
American Declaration, it is necessary to examine the evolution that the Inter-American System 
has undergone since the adoption of this regional instrument.15 The Court set out its basic 
argument that: 
[T]o determine the legal status of the American Declaration it is appropriate to look to the 
inter-American system of today in the light of the evolution it has undergone since the 
adoption of the Declaration, rather than to examine the normative value and significance 
which that instrument was believed to have had in 1948. … The evolution of the here 
relevant “inter-American law” mirrors on the regional level the developments in 
contemporary international law and especially in human rights law, which distinguished 
that law from classical international law to a significant extent.16 
 
In this advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court pointed out that the regional 
development of international law, especially of human rights, differs from the classical view 
                                                 
12. Ibid.  
13. For a discussion on this non-positivistic approach based on individual legal personality, see Antonio Augusto 
Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 213-273; Hersch 
Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London : Stevens and Sons Limited, 1950) 27-60, 69-72 and 
111-113. 
14. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 
64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 
10, para 2 (July 14, 1989) (Interpretation of the American Declaration). 
15. Ibid at para 37. 
16. Ibid at paras 37-38 (emphasis added). 
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of international law. Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the basis of this difference, 
the recent evolution of international human rights law – especially after the Second World 
War17 – and the nature of the American Declaration, which combines natural law and legal 
positivism, suggest that a significant change in contemporary international human rights law is 
precisely the codification of the individual legal personality and its centrality in the legal 
system. This view departs from the “classical” international law system grounded in the 
Westphalian paradigm, which placed complete power into the hands of states as the only 
subjects of international law.18 In other words, the main aspect of international human rights 
law is the protection of individuals as bearers of rights and duties and not the protection of 
mutual state interests.  
Thus, this regional instrument was created as a list of fundamental interests of 
individuals that flow from their legal personality and that the American states should take into 
consideration on the international and domestic levels. These “interests” could later become 
legally binding norms if domestic legislation or international treaties codified them. Moreover, 
this Declaration became even more important as these “interests,” or “soft” rights and duties, 
changed status and acquired a normative character.19 This normativity can be divided into 
broad and specific. Rights crystallized in the American Declaration acquired specific 
normative status either by way of custom or general principles of law, or due to the 
interpretation of the Charter of American States.20 Furthermore, the American Declaration 
acquired broad normative status because it recognizes that individuals have interests at the 
                                                 
17. With the creation of the United Nations, the “international bill of rights” and the regional human rights treaties 
established a human rights system part of general international law, which seeks to protect individuals. See John 
P. Humphrey, “The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation”, (1976)17 Wm &Mary L Rev 
 527; see also Thomas Buergenthal, “International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and 
Prospects”, (1988) 63 Wash L Rev 1.  
18. For a Westphalian view of international law see Oppenheim, supra note 7 at 362-369. 
19. Thomas Buergenthal et al, International Human Rights in a Nutshell 4th edn, (United States: Thomson Reuters, 
2009) 262-263. 
20. Malcolm Shaw, International Law 5th edn, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 260 (arguing, in 
the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that a non-binding declaration may come to acquire 
normative force in these ways).  
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international level, that is, they have rights and duties under international law that need the 
international community’s consideration. 
In considering whether the American Declaration possessed normative force, the Inter-
American Court stated that the OAS Charter refers to fundamental rights in its preamble and a 
number of provisions, but the Court did not list or define them.21 Furthermore, the Court 
pointed out that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights22 protects rights 
“enunciated and defined in the American Declaration”23 based on Article 1 of the Inter-
American Commission’s Statute.24 Moreover, it acknowledged that the OAS General 
Assembly has “repeatedly recognized that the American Declaration is a source of 
international obligations for the member States of the OAS.”25  
Based on these arguments, the Inter-American Court held that “the member states of 
the Organization have signaled their agreement that the Declaration contains and defines the 
fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter.”26 The Court thus unanimously decided 
that although the Declaration is not a treaty, and the American Convention remains the first 
source of obligations to its members:27 
For the member States of the Organization, the Declaration is the text that defines the human 
rights referred to in the Charter. Moreover, Articles 1(2) (b) and 20 of the Commission’s 
Statute define the competence of that body with respect to the human rights enunciated in 
the Declaration, with the result that to this extent the American Declaration is for these 
States a source of international obligations related to the Charter of the Organization.28 
 
Accordingly, the Inter-American Court recognized that international human rights law 
needed to be interpreted in light of subsequent developments, without necessarily referencing 
                                                 
21. Interpretation of the American Declaration, supra note 14 at para 39. 
22. Organization of American States, Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 112, 150, Apr. 30, 1948, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 1, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. 
23. Interpretation of the American Declaration, supra note 14 at para 41. 
24. Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 1. Res. 447 
adopted by the General Assembly at its 9th Regular Session, La Paz, Bolivia (Oct. 1979), reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 133 
(1992). 
25. Interpretation of the American Declaration, supra note 14 at para 42. 
26. Ibid at para 43. 
27. Ibid at paras 46-47. 
28. Ibid at para 45. 
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to the authors of an international instrument. Based on this theoretical foundation, the Court 
acknowledged the binding status of the American Declaration as the authoritative definition of 
the expression “human rights” in the OAS Charter. The Court thus recognized the normative 
status of the American Declaration based on reasoning similar to that commonly accepted for 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is generally considered to hold the 
authoritative interpretation and definition of the references to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms contained in the Charter of the United Nations.29 However, the Court did not 
elaborate on the differences between human rights declarations with normative force and 
human rights treaties.  
As previously explained, human rights declarations can have a broad or specific 
normativity. Specific normativity occurs when a right enshrined in the declaration becomes a 
general principle of law or a customary norm of international law. The normativity is broad 
when the instrument expresses the intrinsic elements of human rights: it establishes rights, 
rights holders and duty bearers. The broad or general normativity of declarations is not the 
same as that of treaties. In declarations, the right establishes that individuals are, generally 
speaking, right holders and addressees of rights, while states have the duty to acknowledge 
these individuals’ status. 
In general terms, human rights have three intrinsic elements: a right, a right holder and 
a right to a claim. When “A has a right to x with respect to B,” one can point out the existence 
of a right holder (A) and a duty bearer (B). Consequently, A’s entitlement to x in relation to B 
indicates that B has a correlative obligation to A, and thus, A can make “special claims upon B 
                                                 
29. See Humphrey, supra note 17 at 529 (stating that the Universal Declaration “provides the framework for the 
international recognition of those human rights and fundamental freedoms that were left undefined by the 
Charter”); Shaw, supra note 20 at 260 (discussing the influence and significance of the Universal Declaration, 
including as an interpretation of the UN Charter); Buergenthal, supra note 19 at 41–46 (discussing different bases 
for the Universal Declaration’s binding force); Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “The Interdependence of All 
Human Rights – Obstacles and Challenges to Their Implementation”, (1998) 50 INT’L J SOC SCI 513 at 513 
(Cançado Trindade, Interdependence) (stating that “the Universal Declaration is widely recognized today as an 
authoritative interpretation of human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter.”). 
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to discharge these obligations.”30 Thus, a right holder, that is, an individual, has a human right 
against states, quasi-state entities or even against other individuals. If this right is breached, the 
right holder possesses a right of claim against the violator of his fundamental right. 
Accordingly, the sentence “A has a right to x with respect to B” captures the basic intrinsic 
elements of human rights: right holders, claims, and duty bearers. 
In international law, this philosophical theory of human rights encompassing the 
existence of right holders, claims, and duty bearers applies to human rights treaties. Unlike 
treaties, declarations do not establish specific binding obligations but only propositions that 
states must follow when conducting their domestic and international affairs. However, they can 
crystalize general normative obligations, especially through the codification of customary 
international law, that grant the obligations mandatory force. In certain cases they can even 
acquire jus cogens status.31 However, the American Declaration was not envisaged as an 
instrument crystalizing specific obligations whereby a breach of right can lead to a claim 
against the party that violated the right holder’s fundamental right. Nonetheless, the 
Declaration establishes a general normativity, that is, the view that individuals possess a 
general right to be right holders of human rights and states have the duty to acknowledge this 
characteristic as part of the international human rights system. The American Declaration 
upholds that individuals are the bearers of rights and duties at the international level and have 
interests different from those of states. Furthermore, states have the duty to acknowledge this 
status. 
                                                 
30. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 
ch 10 and 11. 
31. On the force of customary norms to grant normativity to declarations, see Comm. on Human Rights, Rep. on 
the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the Commission, Mr. 
Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, para 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/23 (Jan. 28, 1987); Shaw, supra note 20 at 260. Hannum 
affirms that the Universal Declaration, for example, has acquired jus cogens status. See Hurst Hannum, “The 
Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law”, (1996) 25 Ga J Int’l & 
Comp L 287, 326. 
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The American Declaration thus sets the parameters of a human-centered or a pro 
homine interpretation of international law. The regional instruments of human rights of the 
Organization of American States must be interpreted and applied taking into consideration that 
individuals are the bearers of rights and duties at the international level and have interests of 
their own without the tutelage of states. The American Convention on Human Rights 
supplemented this reasoning by specifying the rights and claims of individuals. This crystalized 
an effective dichotomous relation between states and individuals, whereby the violation of a 
right can lead to a right to claim before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights32 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.33 Moreover, regarding the interpretation of the 
Convention, Article 29 precluded restrictive interpretation of rights and consequently set in 
motion the extensive interpretative approach of the Inter-American Court.34  
This position diverges from the classical view of international law centered on the 
interests of states.35 As the Inter-American Court pointed out in its advisory opinion on the 
Interpretation of the American Declaration, international human rights differs from classical 
international law to a significant extent. The main divergence concerns the centrality of 
individual humans in international human rights, as reflected through the pro individual or pro 
homine system in the American Declaration. Article 29 of the American Convention further 
develops this premise in the scope of legal interpretation. In a pro homine system, rights 
recognized in human rights instruments flow from the human person and therefore cannot be 
                                                 
32. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, ch VII. 
33. Ibid, ch 8. 
34. Article 29 spells out that “[n]o provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a. permitting any State 
Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this 
Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b. restricting the enjoyment or 
exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another 
convention to which one of the said states is a party; c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in 
the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d. excluding or 
limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of 
the same nature may have.” Ibid, art 29. 
35. See Oppenheim, supra note 7. 
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limited by states “to a greater extent than is provided for” in the instrument itself.36 
Accordingly, judges must apply the American Convention based on a pro individual system 
with the possibility of extensive application of rights. 
States themselves designed an inter-American human rights system grounded on the 
human person as a subject of rights and duties stemming from their legal personality. Thus, 
international human rights law is based on an individual-centered or pro homine system. The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights extensively discussed and applied this notion of an 
individual-centered or pro individual interpretation arguably because of two main practical 
considerations. First, international human rights law concerns the well being of the human 
person either on the individual or collective level. Second, the American continent comprises 
a diverse group of individuals with different social, political, historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds, all of them equally entitled to international protection. 
Accordingly, the pro homine system accommodates the diversity of the American 
continent based on an extensive application of rights focusing on and flowing from the human 
person. The Inter-American Court is often called to settle disputes that require an extensive, 
individual-centric interpretation. Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez asserted that: 
When exercising its contentious jurisdiction, the Inter-American Court is duty-bound to 
observe the provisions of the American Convention, to interpret them in accordance with 
the rules that the Convention itself sets forth . . . . It must also heed the principle of 
interpretation that requires that the object and purpose of the treaties be considered (article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention), referenced below, and the principle pro homine of the 
international law of human rights - frequently cited in this Court's case-law - which requires 
the interpretation that is conducive to the fullest protection of persons, all for the ultimate 
purpose of preserving human dignity, ensuring fundamental rights and encouraging their 
advancement.37 
 
                                                 
36. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 29 (a). 
37. Sergio Garcia Ramirez, “Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez in the Judgment on the Merits 
and Reparations in the “Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case,”  (2002) 19 Ariz J Int’L & Comp L 449 
(emphasis added). 
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Following this line of thought, Henderson also asserts that the pro homine framework, 
which he calls “principle,” is a logical element of international human rights law.38 He argues 
that international human rights norms must always be in favor of individuals: the hermeneutical 
criterion informing that the interpretation of protected rights must always be extensive is an 
essential part of international human rights law.39 This is the position of the Inter-American 
Court itself. For instance, the Court stated that it could compare the American Convention with 
other international instruments in order “to stress certain aspects concerning the manner in 
which a certain right has been formulated.”40 Moreover, the Court found that this approach to 
legal interpretation cannot be used restrictively to limit rights enshrined in the Convention.41 
Consequently, grounding its view on Article 29 of the American Convention that forbids 
restrictive interpretation, the Court held that: 
[I]f in the same situation both the American Convention and another international treaty are 
applicable, the rule most favorable to the individual must prevail. Considering that the 
Convention itself establishes that its provisions should not have a restrictive effect on the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed in other international instruments, it makes even less 
sense to invoke restrictions contained in those other international instruments, but which are 
not found in the Convention, to limit the exercise of the rights and freedoms that the latter 
recognizes.42 
 
This approach intends to advance human protection beyond the initial set of rights 
spelled out by the American Convention in order to meet social needs and aspirations. The 
approach also seeks to better protect human dignity by taking into account natural law and legal 
positivism, two parts of a system that recognizes the individual legal personality in a pluralistic 
world. By adopting an expansive interpretation in favor of individuals, the Inter-American 
Court is thus able to refer to different human rights instruments and render decisions that extend 
                                                 
38. Humberto Henderson, “Los Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos en el Orden Interna: La 
Importancia del Principio Pro Homine” (International Human Rights Treaties in Domestic Law: the Importance 
of the Pro Homine Principle) (2004) 39 Revista I I D H 71 at 87-88. 
39. Ibid at 88. 
40. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism ( American 
Convention on Human Rights, arts 13 and 29), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, 
para 51 (Nov. 13, 1985).  
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid at para 52. 
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beyond the traditional scope of the American Convention and that pertain to other areas of 
international law, such as international humanitarian law, environmental law and indigenous 
rights.43  
III. The Application of a Multicultural and Individual-Centered Interpretation by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
Based on Article 29 of the American Convention, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,44 and the human-centralization of human rights, the Inter-American Court, can 
constantly refer to different treaties or instruments in general in order to render decisions that 
escape the traditional scope of the provisions of the American Convention.45 However, the 
American Convention contains no specific provision enshrining indigenous rights. The Court 
has advanced the protection of indigenous rights in a series of cases by applying this pro-
individual principle that recognizes individual beings as international legal subjects endowed 
with diverse cultural backgrounds. 
Indeed, the application of this pro homine approach has substantially increased the 
protection of indigenous rights in the American continent.46 For instance, the notion of 
communal lands is vital for the protection of indigenous rights.47 In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court protected this notion by holding 
that Nicaragua had neither demarcated the communal lands of the Awas Tingni Community, 
                                                 
43. Lucas Lixinski, “Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the 
Service of the Unity of International Law” (2010) 21 Eur J Int’L L585 at 603. 
44. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
45. Lixinski, supra note 43 at 603. 
46. The following states have ratified the American Convention and accepted the Court’s jurisdiction: Argentina, 
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. However, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the American Convention on 
Human Rights and Venezuela denounced the American Convention. See I/A Court History, The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/historia-de-la-corteidh (last visited 
April, 9, 2013); see also Press Release, Organization of American States, IACHR Regrets Decision of Venezuela 
to Denounce the American Convention on Human Rights (Sept. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2012/117.asp. 
47. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural 
Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System (2010) 35 Am Indian L Rev 
263, 304–05 (2011). 
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nor adopted effective measures to ensure the Community’s property rights to its ancestral lands 
and natural resources.48 The Inter-American Court stated that indigenous peoples’ customary 
law must be especially taken under consideration.49 It concluded that due to customary 
practices, land possession “should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to 
property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property, and for consequent 
registration.”50 Based on the teleological pro homine principle enshrined in Article 29 of the 
American Convention, the Inter-American Court extensively interpreted the application of the 
right to property enshrined in this regional treaty51 to cover the protection of communal 
property and the recognition of indigenous communities’ close ties with the land. The 
protection of communal lands flows from the pro homine interpretation, which on its turn is 
possible due to a mix of positivism – state agreement – with the natural law view that rights 
and duties stem from the human personality and not solely from state creation.  
The Court used this individual-based approach to decide that the right to property 
enshrined in Article 21 also includes the rights of members of the indigenous communities to 
communal property.52 The Court reached this decision taking into account that indigenous 
peoples have a communitarian tradition, in which land ownership is not focused on an 
individual person but on the group and its community.53 This connection to the land, according 
to the Court, is material and spiritual in a way that it is part of “the fundamental basis of their 
                                                 
48. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, para 173 (Aug. 31, 2001). In this case, the Inter-American Court, in the words of Cançado 
Trindade, “went into depth in an integral interpretation of the indigenous cosmovision, insofar as the relationship 
of the members of the community with their ancestral lends was concerned.” Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, 
“The Right to Cultural Identity in the Evolving Jurisprudential Construction of the Inter- American Court of 
Human Rights”[Cançado Trindade, Multiculturalism], in Sienho Yee & Jacques-Yvan Morin eds, 
Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in Honour of Edward MCwhinney supra note 4 at 477, 485.  
49. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra note 48 at para 151. 
50. Ibid. 
51. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 21. This provision establishes that: “1. Everyone 
has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the 
interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for 
reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 3. Usury 
and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.” Ibid. 
52. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra note 48 at para 148. 
53. Ibid paras 148-149. 
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cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival.”54 Although there is no 
explicit provision regulating the relationship of indigenous communities with their land, the 
Court adopted a pro individual interpretation of the American Convention and decided that 
Nicaragua must adopt the measures necessary to establish “an effective mechanism for 
delimitation, demarcation and titling of the property of indigenous communities, in accordance 
with their customary law, values [and] customs.”55 
The Court confirmed the right to communal property as a group right – which embodies 
the right of claim and natural resources – in subsequent cases. The following paradigmatic case 
was Yakye Indigenous Community v. Paraguay in which the Court applied an extensive 
interpretation of Article 21 of the American Convention with the aid of exogenous legal 
instruments.56 In this case, the Inter-American Commission affirmed that Paraguay did not 
adequately ensure the enjoyment of the ancestral property rights of the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community and that this situation made it impossible for the Community to own and possess 
its territory, placing the Community in a vulnerable situation in terms of food, medical and 
public health care.57 In light of the particularities of the case, Paraguay asserted that its 
“[d]omestic legislation does not encompass a means to acquire the right to property based on a 
historical right.”58 Furthermore, Paraguay added that “while there is a generic recognition of 
the traditional ownership right of indigenous peoples to their land[,] [for them to enjoy the right 
to such property,] it is necessary for them to actually possess it and live as a community on that 
land.”59  
                                                 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid at para 164.  
56. Yakye Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, 2, para 2 (Jun. 17, 
2005). For a brief comment on the relation between the Yakye case and multiculturalism, see Cançado Trindade, 
Multiculturalism, supra note 48 at 488–90. 
57. Yakye Indigenous Community, supra note 56 at para 2.  
58. Ibid at 94. 
59. Ibid.  
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In response, the Inter-American Court applied a pro individual interpretation. It 
mentioned Article 14(3) of ILO Convention No. 169,60 incorporated into Paraguayan domestic 
legislation by Law No. 234/93, which spells out that “[a]dequate procedures shall be 
established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.”61 
The Court used this provision to extend the scope of the American Convention: it reasoned that 
Article 14 of the ILO Convention, in combination with Articles 8 and 25 of the American 
Convention, obligated Paraguay to provide effective means of making such claims – with due 
process guarantees – to the members of the indigenous communities, as part of their right to 
communal property.62  
Again, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights analyzed the American Convention 
and acknowledged that indigenous communities have a special relation, which states must 
respect and effectively protect, to acknowledge the right of claim to communal lands.63 The 
Inter-American Court, mentioning the European Court of Human Rights, held that human 
rights treaties are living instruments, and that their interpretation must go hand in hand with 
the evolution of international law and current living conditions.64 This evolutionary 
interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation embodied in Article 29 of 
the American Convention,65 as well as those set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.66 In other words, in adopting its pro-individual approach, the Inter-American Court 
expressly acknowledges that treaty interpretation should take into account instruments directly 
                                                 
60. International Labour Organisation, Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, Jun. 27, 1989, ILO No. 169, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383  (“ILO Convention No. 169”). 
61. Yakye Indigenous Community, supra note 56 at para 95. 
62. Ibid at para 96.  
63. Ibid at paras 96, 124 and 126. 
64. Ibid at paras 125. 
65. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 29.  
66. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, art 31(1) provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, art. 31.  
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related to it (paragraph two of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention) and the system of which it 
is a part (paragraph three of Article 31 of said Convention)67.  
The Court thus takes the position that “in its analysis of the scope of Article 21 of the 
Convention, mentioned above, the Court deems it useful and appropriate to resort to other 
international treaties, aside from the American Convention, such as ILO Convention No. 169, 
to interpret its provisions in accordance with the evolution of the inter-American system, taking 
into account related developments in International Human Rights Law.”68 By referring to the 
need to interpret and apply the American Convention in the context of evolving human rights 
in contemporary international law, the Court argued that the indigenous provisions of the ILO 
Convention No. 169 could “shed light on the content and scope of Article 21 of the American 
Convention.”69 Applying this criterion, the Court found that “the close relationship of 
indigenous peoples with the land must be acknowledged and understood as the fundamental 
basis for their culture, spiritual life, wholeness, economic survival, and preservation and 
transmission to future generations.”70 
The Court also mentioned Article 13 of ILO Convention No. 169, which establishes that 
states must respect “the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples 
concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they 
occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship.”71 
Consequently, the Court concluded that Article 21 of the American Convention safeguards the 
close ties of indigenous peoples with their traditional lands and the natural resources associated 
with the indigenous culture, including the components derived from them.72  
                                                 
67. Yakye Indigenous Community, supra note 56 at para 126. 
68. Ibid at para 127. 
69. Ibid at para 130. 
70. Ibid at para 131. 
71. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 60 at art 13. See also Yakye Indigenous Community, supra note 56 at 
para 136. 
72. Yakye Indigenous Community, supra note 56 at paras 136–37. 
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Ultimately, the Inter-American Court recognized that there is a dual right embodied in 
Article 21. First, there is the traditional (more Western) view of the right to private property. 
Second, this Article comprises the right of indigenous communities to their territory and natural 
resources in accordance with their indigenous culture, customs and spiritual life. These two 
views, however, are interpreted as not being in conflict with another. As the Inter-American 
Court pointed out, this teleological interpretation of the American Convention does not entail 
that every time a conflict emerges between the territorial interests of private individuals (or of 
a state) and those of indigenous communities, the latter necessarily prevail over the former.73 
Nevertheless, when states are justifiably unable to adopt measures to return the traditional 
territory and communal resources to indigenous communities, the state must not only grant 
compensation based on a discretionary criteria, but there must be a consensus with the 
indigenous peoples involved, in accordance with the peoples’ own mechanisms of consultation, 
values, customs and customary laws.74 This reasoning uses a pro homine or pro individual 
interpretation of the American Convention assisted by Convention No. 169 of the ILO, and 
takes into consideration the existence of a pluralistic world comprising of different peoples 
with different cultures, backgrounds and views.75  
Analyzing whether Paraguay breached the American Convention’s Article 4,76 which 
grants people the right to life, the Inter-American Court sought to apply an extensive pro 
individual interpretation. It referred to views of the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, in General Comment 14 on the right to enjoy the highest attainable 
standard of health,77 to decide that indigenous peoples can be placed in a situation of 
                                                 
73. Ibid at para 149. 
74. Ibid at paras 149, 151. 
75. Ibid at paras 149–151. 
76. American Convention, supra note 5, art 4(1) spells out that “[e]very person has the right to have his life 
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 
77. Yakye Indigenous Community, supra note 56 at para 166.  
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vulnerability if access to their ancestral lands, and consequently, access to food and clean water, 
are at stake.78 Based on a pro individual interpretation of the American Convention, the Court 
established that the state concerned breached Article 4(1) and Article 1(1) to the detriment of 
the Yakye Axa Community.79 Among other orders, the Court decided that Paraguay must take 
the necessary steps to guarantee the property rights of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community 
and must publicly acknowledge its responsibility.80 
Similarly, in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the Court followed 
the pro homine approach established in previous cases and advanced the understanding that 
communal property is attached to the indigenous community’s worldview and cultural identity 
as subjects of law.81 In this case, the Inter-American Commission filed a complaint that 
Paraguay did not ensure the ancestral property rights of the Sawhoyamaxa Community and its 
members.82 The Inter-American Court applied an extensive pro individual interpretation of the 
case by analyzing the content and scope of Article 21 along with Convention No. 169 of the 
ILO, and this was appropriate since Paraguay had previously ratified the ILO Convention and 
incorporated its provisions into domestic legislation.83 The Inter-American Court followed the 
precedent set by previous cases on the evolutionary individual-centered legal reasoning 
extending the scope of Article 21 of the American Convention in the light of exogenous 
treaties.84 Based on this interpretation, the Court decided that the close ties indigenous 
communities have to their traditional lands, including their natural resources and incorporeal 
                                                 
78. Ibid at paras 167. 
79. Ibid at para 176. Furthermore, Paraguay violated Articles 8, 21 and 25 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights. Ibid at paras 103 
80. Ibid at paras 225–26. The Court decided that Paraguay must identify the traditional territory of the members of 
the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community and grant it to them free of cost and must pay pecuniary damages and 
costs and expenses. Ibid at para 233.  
81. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, (Mar. 29, 2006). 
82. Ibid at para 2. See also Cançado Trindade, Multiculturalism, supra note 48 at 490. 
83. Ibid at para 117. 
84. Ibid.  
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elements, “must be secured” under the American Convention.85 The Court added that this close 
relation with their traditional lands and natural resources exists not only because the resources 
are the Community’s main means of survival, but also because they “form part of [the 
Community’s] worldview, of their religiousness, and consequently, of their cultural identity.”86 
The Inter-American Court hence affirmed that it must interpret and apply international 
human rights law while considering the “evolution of the Inter-American system.” The Court 
did not define nor give the general characteristics of this evolution, but as its body of case law 
suggests, this system encompasses an amalgamation of both a natural law approach and legal 
positivism within a pro individual framework. In other words, individuals are subjects of 
international law and have interests that the Inter-American human rights bodies need to take 
into account. These interests do not form a unified group of rights and duties granted to 
individuals as the American continent includes a diverse group of individuals with different 
cultural, political and historical backgrounds, and the Inter-American Court needs to 
acknowledge this pluralistic system. This general rule is crystallized by the preambles and 
normative characters of the human rights instruments of the inter-American system as a whole 
and, specifically, by Article 29 of the American Convention.87  
In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the Court held that indigenous communities have the 
right of participation in the exploration of natural resources as part of the communal right to 
property.88 Again, analyzing questions out of scope of the literal meaning of the Convention, 
the Court extended the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions favoring the human person 
with the aid of previous cases and external legal instruments and reference to other tribunals. 
                                                 
85. Ibid at para 118. 
86. Ibid. 
87. The preambles of the American Declaration and Convention arguably acknowledge the individual legal 
personality. Article 29, providing the possibility of an extensive individual-centered interpretation complement 
the recognition of this legal personality and allow for a pro homine interpretation and application of rights leading 
to the recognition of indigenous rights even though there is no provision in both instruments making explicit 
reference to indigenous peoples. See American Declaration, supra note 11, preamble; and American Convention 
of Human Rights, supra note 5, preamble. 
88. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) Nº 146 (2006). 
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In this case, the Inter-American Court adopted a similar tone as in other cases and affirmed that 
Suriname failed to recognize the Saramaka People’s right to use and enjoy their territory; that 
the State allegedly violated the right to judicial protection by failing to provide an effective 
access to justice, particularly the right to property in accordance with communal traditions; and 
that Suriname allegedly failed to adopt the necessary domestic provisions to provide such rights 
to the Saramakas.89 To reach these conclusions, the Inter-American Court analyzed possible 
restrictions on the right to property regarding concessions for the exploration and extraction of 
certain natural resources, and informed that Suriname needed to follow three safeguards in 
order to protect indigenous rights.90 First, states need to guarantee an effective participation of 
the members of the indigenous community, in conformity with their customs and traditions. 
Secondly, states need to ensure the indigenous community’s right to receive a reasonable 
benefit from the exploration and extraction of natural resources within their territory. Finally, 
independent and technically capable entities, with the state’s supervision, must perform a prior 
environmental and social impact assessment of the indigenous community’s territory.91 
To find that Suriname had indeed breached Article 21 of the American Convention,92 
the Court mentioned foreign instruments and decisions/views. Referring to the Human Rights 
Committee’s views in Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand, the Court decided that the right 
to culture of an indigenous community under Article 27 of the ICCPR could be restricted if 
that community had been able to partake in the decision to restrict such right.93 Moreover, the 
Court mentioned Article 32 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which was approved by the UN General Assembly with the support of Suriname.94 
                                                 
89. Ibid at para 2. 
90. Ibid at para 129. 
91. Ibid. 
92. Ibid at paras 60-61. 
93. Ibid at para 130. 
94. Ibid at para 131. 
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Accordingly, the Inter-American Court acknowledged the necessity to “ensure an 
effective participation of members of the Saramaka people in development or investment plans 
within their territory.”95 Moreover, the Court mentioned the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people reaching a similar 
decision by affirming that “[f]ree, prior and informed consent is essential for the [protection 
of] human rights of indigenous peoples in relation to major development projects.”96 
Furthermore, the Inter-American Court, besides referring to Article 15(2) of the ILO 
Convention No. 169, informed that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
has stressed the necessity of prior informed consent of indigenous communities when major 
exploitation activities are planned in their territories and “that the equitable sharing of benefits 
to be derived from such exploitation be ensured.”97 Thus, the Court concluded that Suriname 
breached, to the detriment of the members of the Saramaka people, the right to property 
crystalized in Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the right to judicial 
protection under Article 25.98 
In the case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname, the Court dealt with displaced 
indigenous communities, the protection of refugees within the scope of indigenous rights and 
the special relation that indigenous groups have with the dead in the light of the cultural and 
spiritual particularities.99 Again, seeking to ensure an effective protection of indigenous rights 
even without explicit treaty provisions, the Court applies the pro homine principle to interpret 
its Convention in the light of previous cases, exogenous treaties, and decisions/views from 
other tribunals and bodies. In this case, the Inter-American Commission found that members 
of the Surinamese armed forces attacked the N’djuka Maroon village of Moiwana and 
                                                 
95. Ibid at para 133. 
96. Ibid at para 135. 
97. Ibid at para 140. 
98. Ibid at paras 60-61. 
99. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) 
No. 124, para 3 (2005). See also Cançado Trindade, Multiculturalism, supra note 48, at 491. 
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murdered over 40 men, women and children, and destroyed their village.100 Moreover, those 
who were able to escape the attack allegedly fled into exile or internal displacement.101 The 
Commission pointed out that there was no adequate investigation of the situation, nobody was 
prosecuted or punished and the survivors remained displaced from their lands.102 Consequently, 
the indigenous peoples were allegedly “unable to return to their lands and to their traditional 
way of life.”103 The Commission thus argued that although the attack itself occurred before 
Suriname's ratification of the American Convention and its recognition of the Court's 
jurisdiction, the denial of justice and the displacement of the Moiwana community fall under 
the subject to the Court's jurisdiction.104  
The Inter-American Court reminded that Suriname’s duties to investigate, prosecute 
and punish the responsible individuals are not restricted to the calendar year of 1986. 
Accordingly, the Court can assess Suriname’s obligations from the date when it recognized the 
Court’s competence.105 Moreover, it acknowledged the lack of effort from Suriname to provide 
effective remedies and its disregard for the communities' traditions. The Court pointed out that 
the long-standing lack of effective remedies is normally a source of suffering and anguish for 
victims and their family members.106 Moreover, the Court found that:  
[T]he ongoing impunity has a particularly severe impact upon the Moiwana villagers, as a 
N’djuka people. As indicated in the proven facts (supra paragraph 86(10)), justice and 
collective responsibility are central precepts within traditional N’djuka society. If a 
community member is wronged, the next of kin – which includes all members of his or her 
matrilineage – are obligated to avenge the offense committed. If that relative has been killed, 
the N’djuka believe that his or her spirit will not be able to rest until justice has been 
accomplished. While the offense goes unpunished, the affronted spirit – and perhaps other 
ancestral spirits – may torment their living next of kin.107 
                                                 
100. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 99 at para 3. 




105. Ibid at para 43. 
106. Ibid at para 94.  
107. Ibid at para 95. 
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The Court found that due to the impunity of the 1986 attack, community members were 
deeply concerned that they could once again face grave hostilities if they were to return to their 
traditional lands.108 Furthermore, they were unaware of what has happened to the remains of 
their loved ones,109 a cause of great suffering since it is deeply important under their tradition 
to possess “the physical remains of the deceased, as the corpse must be treated in a particular 
manner during the N’djuka death ceremonies and must be placed in the burial ground of the 
appropriate descent group.”110 Moreover, the abandonment of the Moiwana community’s 
traditional lands disrupted the especial relationship they have with their ancestral territory.111 
Taking into account these facts, the Court affirmed that Suriname breached Article 5 of the 
American Convention.112 Evaluating whether Suriname breached Article 22 of the American 
Convention, the Court referred to the UN Human Rights Committee:  
[T]he Tribunal shares the views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee as set out 
in its General Comment nº 27, which States that the right to freedom of movement and 
residence consists, inter alia, in the following: a) the right of all those lawfully within a 
State to move freely in that State, and to choose his or her place of residence; and b) the 
right of a person to enter his or her country and the right to remain in one’s country. In 
addition, the enjoyment of this right must not be made dependent on any particular purpose 
or reason for the person wanting to move or to stay in a place.113 
 
In order to extend the scope of Article 22(1) of the American Convention114 to account 
for the situation of refugees and displaced individuals, the Court mentioned the guiding 
                                                 
108. Ibid at para 97. 
109. Ibid at para 100. 
110. Ibid at para 98. 
111. Ibid at para 102. 
112. Ibid at para 103. Article 5 of the American Convention spells out that: “1. every person has the right to have 
his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected; 2. no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person; 3. punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal; 
4. accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons, and shall be 
subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons; 5. minors while subject to criminal 
proceedings shall be separated from adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so 
that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors; 6. punishments consisting of deprivation of 
liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners.” See American 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5 at art 5. 
113. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 99 at para 110. 
114. This provision provides that “[e]very person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the right to move 
about in it, and to reside in it subject to the provisions of the law.” See American Convention on Human Rights, 
supra note 5 at art 22(1). 
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principles of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced 
Persons.115 As for the question of Article 22 of the Convention, the Court referred again to the 
UN Human Rights Committee and cited the case of a Colombian civil rights attorney who, 
after receiving death threats and suffering an attempt against his life, was forced into exile in 
the United Kingdom, which, according to the Committee, breached his right of movement and 
residence.116 Accordingly, the Inter-American Court concluded that Suriname breached Article 
22(1) of the American Convention by failing to establish conditions and “provide the means 
that would allow the Moiwana community members to return voluntarily, in safety and with 
dignity, to their traditional lands.”117  
Furthermore, the Court asserted that although the Moiwana community members are 
not indigenous to the region,118 they “lived in the area in strict adherence to N’djuka custom 
and they are inextricably tied to these lands and the sacred sites.”119 In the light of these 
considerations, the Court concluded that Suriname breached Article 21 of the American 
Convention.120 Moreover, the Court sustained that Suriname’s “manifest inactivity” clearly 
failed to follow the principle of due diligence.121 It affirmed that it shares the same view of the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, which pointed out the lack of effective remedies 
                                                 
115. The Tribunal stresses the following principles: “1(1). Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, 
the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country. They shall 
not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the ground that they are internally 
displaced. 5. All authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under 
international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid 
conditions that might lead to displacement of persons. 8. Displacement shall not be carried out in a manner that 
violates the rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of those affected. 9. States are under a particular obligation 
to protect against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with 
a special dependency on and attachment to their lands. 14(1). Every internally displaced person has the right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence. 28(1). Competent authorities have the primary 
duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced 
persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle 
voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned 
or resettled internally displaced persons.” Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 99 at para 111.  
116. Ibid at para 116. See also Luis Asdrúbal Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
Communication Nº 859/1999 (15 April 2002), para 7.4. 
117. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 99 at para 120. 
118. The Moiwana Village was settled by N’djuka clans in the 19th century. Ibid at para 132. 
119. Ibid at paras 132, 133.  
120. Ibid at para 135. 
121. Ibid at para 156.  
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available for victims of human rights violations in Suriname.122 The Court thus held the State 
breached Articles 8 (right to a fair trial)123 and 25 (right to judicial protection)124 of the 
American Convention.125 
In this case, the Inter-American Court thus followed previous decisions and 
strengthened the protection of human rights in four different areas. First, following the 
reasoning of previous cases, it acknowledged the status of individuals – including indigenous 
peoples – as subjects of international law. Second, the Court recognized that the individual 
legal personality includes an interpretation that takes into account the fact that the world 
comprises different individuals with diverse cultural, historical and religious backgrounds. 
Third, the Court broadened the scope of the American Convention to cover situations 
specifically affecting indigenous communities by referring to previous judgments and other 
human rights instruments or global instruments of protection. Fourth, the Court kept the 
tradition of advancing the reparations system of the American Convention by adding to the 
mere recognition of three kinds of rights (civil and political; economic, social and cultural; and 
environmental and collective rights) the other rights of access to international justice and the 
right of memory.126 
                                                 
122.Ibid at para 156. See also U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Suriname, 
CCPR/CO/80/SUR, (2004). 
123. Article 8(1) spells out that: “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a 
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the 
substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and 
obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature” (American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, at 
art 8 (1). 
124. Article 25 (1) establishes that: “Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective 
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized 
by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have 
been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties (Ibid at art 25(1)). 
125. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 99 at para 164. The Inter-American Court also pointed out that 
in 1992, the President of Suriname promulgated the “Amnesty Act 1989”, which grants amnesty to individuals 
who have committed certain criminal acts from January of 1985 to August of 1992, with the exception of crimes 
against humanity. The Court mentioned its own jurisprudence and declared that no domestic law or regulation can 
be used to evade compliance with the Court’s orders mandating the investigation and punishment of those who 
committed human rights violations (Ibid at paras 165, 167); see also “Amnesty Act 1989”, August 19, 1992, 
Statutes of the Republic of Suriname No. 68 (exhibits to the application, vol. II, exhibit 28 at 476-483). 
126. The Inter-American Court can determine that states must build a monument or make some kind of statement 
in memory of the victims of human rights violations. For more on reparations, see Bridget Mayeux and Justin 
Mirabal, Collective and Moral Reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Human Rights Clinic, 
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The Court ordered Suriname to issue an apology to its citizens and, moreover, to build 
a monument in the name of those who lost their lives.127 These actions aim to preserve an idea 
of justice and to give hope to a population that suffered and almost lost all hope that a judicial 
system would ever hear its claims for help. Furthermore, the ruling is a message to future 
generations that justice can be reached on domestic and international levels. Public apologies 
or monuments have symbolic importance. They arguably convey the idea that if domestic 
courts or policy makers are unable or unwilling to establish an effective system to protect 
minority rights, the victims or alleged victims know that there is the possibility of recourse to 
international law in order to finally have their claims heard.  
This pro individual interpretation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is also 
found in Article 29 of the American Convention and takes into account a teleological view of 
human rights that is based on the current evolution of international law. However, the Court 
does not define or detail what this “current evolution” means. The Inter-American Court’s 
approach thus has deeper roots than Article 29. It is based on the whole inter-American human 
rights system established by the American Declaration and Convention, which seek to bring 
together natural law and legal positivism in a framework that recognizes the individual legal 
personality in a pluralistic world. In other words, individuals are subjects of international law 
beyond the traditional sense of possessing rights and duties on the international level.128  
Human rights bodies of the Organization of American States must recognize that 
individuals, who bear rights and duties on the international plane, are not identical but rather 
have different historical, religious, philosophical and cultural backgrounds. Individuals have 
the right to be acknowledged as different and as possessing their own views and particularities. 
                                                 
The University of Texas School of Law, Nov. 2009, at 31, on the Court’s reparation for monuments and 
memorials. 
127. Ibid at para 83. 
128. On the elements of the international legal personality see Shaw, supra note 20 at 195-96. See also Reparation 
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep., 174, 178-79 (Apr. 
11). 
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In acknowledging this system, the Inter-American Court furthers the paradigm of the human 
rights instruments of the OAS itself and crystalizes the position that individuals are subjects of 
international law endowed with diverse cultural backgrounds. 
Cançado Trindade pointed out the special nature of human rights treaties, which do not 
solely regulate state interests.129 Indeed, human rights treaties are sui generis, or with unique 
characteristics, because they set erga omnes obligations to the whole international community 
and not only to states. Consequently, human rights treaties cannot be developed, interpreted, 
or applied without taking into consideration their special nature, which protects individuals by 
accounting for their multicultural backgrounds.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Different individuals with different cultural, ethnic, and philosophical backgrounds share the 
same physical space. Some of these individuals are part of a state’s social or political majority 
while others invariably fall in the minority. Multiculturalism, as part of a human rights idea, 
acknowledges this diversity, and states must also recognize all individuals as bearers of a legal 
personality, regardless of whether they belong – individually or collectively – to a social 
majority or minority.  
The universal system of international human rights law can accommodate this cultural, 
ethnic, and religious diversity: human rights treaties can be interpreted taking into account the 
diversity that is intrinsically part of the individual legal personality. There is thus no conflict 
between the recognition of a multicultural society and the generally vague provisions of the 
American Convention. As Cançado Trindade pointed out, “[a]ll cultures and religions are to 
foster respect for others, are open to minimum universal standards of respectful behavior, and 
to human solidarity, and acknowledge the human dignity of the human person.”130 
                                                 
129 .TRINDADE, International Law for Humankind, supra note 13.  
130. CANÇADO TRINDADE, Multiculturalism, supra note 48 at 498 (emphasis added). 
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This plurality of cultures, which states need to acknowledge, impacts international 
human rights law in two different ways. First, it reaffirms that individuals, who are subjects of 
international law, possess particularities and cultural diversities. Second, international human 
rights courts have to ensure that states are indeed accommodating the cultural and ethnic groups 
within their territory. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, based on the pro homine principle, 
acknowledged this multicultural approach that requires states to uphold individuals’ cultural 
particularities. Based on a legal hermeneutical tool, the Court accepted, at least to some extent, 
the pluralistic concept of the individual legal personality, especially in the case of indigenous 
peoples. Although the Inter-American Court avoids mentioning the specific terms of 
“multiculturalism” or “pluralistic personality,” it acknowledged that indigenous peoples have 
a different culture that states need to consider. The Court thus moved away from international 
law’s solely liberal – focusing only on individual rights – or restrictive approaches – focusing 
only on state consent– to treaty interpretation and application to extend the American 
Convention’s framework of protection to cultural and ethnic minorities. This move represents 
an acceptance of the individual legal personality within a new multicultural framework. 
The Inter-American Court aims to accommodate different views within a framework of 
protection that is increasingly human-centered. Liberal or individualistic approaches to human 
rights, such as the “traditional” right to property, stand with equal weight as the communal or 
collective right to property.131 The Court interprets the provisions of the American Convention 
in the light of both the traditional or liberal understanding of rights enshrined in human rights 
declarations and treaties and the collective, cultural, and sociological views of rights. These 
                                                 
131. On the ground rights see Donnelly, supra note 30 at 149; Michael Freeman, Are There Collective Human 
Rights?(1995) 43 Political Studies 25, 38 ; Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights and the Rights of Groups, (1974) 
18 American Journal of Political Science 725, 741; Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and 
Minorities, (1976) 25 INT’L & Comp L Q 102 at 105-06. 
 INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
 
interpretations are focused on the human person as a subject of rights and duties, that is, as an 
international actor different than states. 
